Formalizing emotion concepts within a Bayesian model of theory of mind
Name
nihms874988.pdf
Description
Accepted version
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258.72 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Saxe, Rebecca R.
Houlihan, Sean Dae
Date Issued
March 2017
Journal
Current Opinion in Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Citation
Saxe, Rebecca, and Sean Dae Houlihan. “Formalizing Emotion Concepts within a Bayesian Model of Theory of Mind.” Current Opinion in Psychology 17 (October 2017): 15–21.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Sensitivity to others’ emotions is foundational for many aspects of human life, yet computational models do not currently approach the sensitivity and specificity of human emotion knowledge. Perception of isolated physical expressions largely supplies ambiguous, low-dimensional, and noisy information about others’ emotional states. By contrast, observers attribute specific granular emotions to another person based on inferences of how she interprets (or ‘appraises’) external events in relation to her other mental states (goals, beliefs, moral values, costs). These attributions share neural mechanisms with other reasoning about minds. Situating emotion concepts in a formal model of people's intuitive theories about other minds is necessary to effectively capture humans’ fine-grained emotion understanding.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.COPSYC.2017.04.019
