Different Missions and Commitment Power in R&D Organization: Theory and Evidence on Industry-University Alliances
Name
SSRN-id1085924.pdf
Size
317.91 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
c8c3f42646ebc8af24c1f29e43d6ab91
Author(s)
Lacetera, Nicola
Date Issued
October 20, 2007
Publisher
Cambridge, Mass.; Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Series/Report no.
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4258-05
Abstract
This paper proposes a theory for why firms conduct some research activities in-house while outsourcing other projects to independent partners, and for why firms retain different degrees of control over collaborative research projects. The focus in on the determinants of a company’s choice to outsource research projects to academic organizations. Due to the different institutional mission of academic organizations, outsourcing a project to a university allows a firm to commit not to terminate or alter a scientifically valuable project before completion. This
commitment is potentially valuable for the firm in an environment where scientific value and
economic value may not coincide, and scientific workers are responsive to the incentives defined
by their community of peers. An economic model that formalizes these arguments is developed.
Empirical hypotheses are then formulated about the kind of research activities firms will out-source to universities, and activities on which they will exert stronger control. Evidence from a
sample of industry-university research agreements, as well as from other large-sample and case studies, shows patterns consistent with the predictions of the model.
Subjects
R&D Organization,
Firm Boundaries
Industry-University Relations
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