The perception-cognition border: A case for architectural division
Name
Perception-Cognition Border [penultimate draft with figures].pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
4.27 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
80bdad66b7c5e6ea16923a51e08ebea8
Author(s)
Green, E. J.
Date Issued
July 2020
Journal
Philosophical Review
Publisher
Cornell University Press
Citation
Green, E. J. “The perception-cognition border: A case for architectural division.” Philosophical Review, 129, 3 (July 2020): 323-393 © 2020 The Author
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
A venerable view holds that a border between perception and cognition is built into our cognitive architecture and that this imposes limits on the way information can flow between them. While the deliverances of perception are freely available for use in reasoning and inference, there are strict constraints on information flow in the opposite direction. Despite its plausibility, this approach to the perception-cognition border has faced criticism in recent years. This article develops an updated version of the architectural approach, which I call the dimension restriction hypothesis (DRH). According to DRH, perceptual processes are constrained to compute over a bounded range of dimensions, while cognitive processes are not. This view allows that perception is cognitively penetrable, but places strict limits on the varieties of penetration that can occur. The article argues that DRH enjoys both theoretical and empirical support, and also defends the view against several objections.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311221
