Insecurity of Detector-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
Name
PhysRevLett.117.250505.pdf
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Author(s)
Sajeed, Shihan
Huang, Anqi
Sun, Shihai
Makarov, Vadim
Curty, Marcos
Xu, Feihu
Date Issued
December 2016
Journal
Physical Review Letters
Publisher
American Physical Society
Citation
Sajeed, Shihan et al. “Insecurity of Detector-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution.” Physical Review Letters 117.25 (2016): n. pag. © 2016 American Physical Society
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (DDI-QKD) held the promise of being robust to detector side channels, a major security loophole in quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations. In contrast to what has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of DDI-QKD is not based on postselected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that DDI-QKD is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit devices’ imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus, free of malicious modifications, which is a key assumption in DDI-QKD.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.117.250505
