Noninterference for a practical DIFC-based operating system
Name
Tromer-2009-Noninterference for a practical DIFC-based operating system.pdf
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389.42 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Krohn, Maxwell
Tromer, Eran
Date Issued
August 2009
Journal
2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
Krohn, M., and E. Tromer. “Noninterference for a Practical DIFC-Based Operating System.” Security and Privacy, 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on. 2009. 61-76. © 2009Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
The Flume system is an implementation of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) at the operating system level. Prior work has shown Flume can be implemented as a practical extension to the Linux operating system, allowing real Web applications to achieve useful security guarantees. However, the question remains if the Flume system is actually secure. This paper compares Flume with other recent DIFC systems like Asbestos, arguing that the latter is inherently susceptible to certain wide-bandwidth covert channels, and proving their absence in Flume by means of a noninterference proof in the communicating sequential processes formalism.
Subjects
noninterference
covert channels
Information flow control
Communicating Sequential Processes
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2009.23
