DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting Flows
Name
wpes18.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
1021.66 KB
Format
Unknown
Checksum (MD5)
b35639cc471645ab2e631faf8ebb0df8
Author(s)
Lu, Chen David
Bhat, Sanjit
Kwon, Albert Hyukjae
Devadas, Srinivas
Date Issued
January 2018
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Citation
Lu, David, Bhat, Sanjit, Kwon, Albert and Devadas, Srinivas. 2018. "DynaFlow: An Efficient Website Fingerprinting Defense Based on Dynamically-Adjusting Flows."
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
© 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Website fingerprinting attacks enable a local adversary to determine which website a Tor user visits. In recent years, several researchers have proposed defenses to counter these attacks. However, these defenses have shortcomings: many do not provide formal guarantees of security, incur high latency and bandwidth overheads, and require a frequently-updated database of website traffic patterns. In this work, we introduce a new countermeasure, DynaFlow, based on dynamically-adjusting flows to protect against website finger-printing. DynaFlow provides a similar level of security as current state-of-the-art while being over 40% more efficient. At the same time, DynaFlow does not require a pre-established database and extends protection to dynamically-generated websites.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
10.1145/3267323.3268960
