An argument against causal decision theory
Name
anaa037.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
181.21 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
904932f1475f317585f634b5ab6acdf5
Author(s)
Spencer, Jack
Date Issued
2021
Journal
Analysis
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Citation
Spencer, Jack. 2021. "An argument against causal decision theory." Analysis, 81 (1).
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Abstract
This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/ANALYS/ANAA037
