The Complexity of Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games
Author(s)
Meyers, Carol A.
Schulz, Andreas S
Date Issued
March 2012
Journal
Networks
Publisher
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Citation
Meyers, Carol A., and Andreas S. Schulz. “The Complexity of Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games.” Networks 59.2 (2012): 252–260. CrossRef. Web.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We investigate issues of complexity related to welfare maximization in congestion games. In particular, we provide a full classification of complexity results for the problem of finding a minimum cost solution to a congestion game, under the model of Rosenthal. We consider both network and general congestion games, and we examine several variants of the problem concerning the structure of the game and the properties of its associated cost functions. Many of these problem variants turn out to be NP-hard, and some are hard to approximate to within any finite factor, unless P = NP. We also identify several versions of the problem that are solvable in polynomial time.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1002/net.20439
