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  5. Sooner is better : covert action to prevent realignment

Sooner is better : covert action to prevent realignment

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1144176185-MIT.pdf

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Author(s)
Nutt, Cullen Gifford.
Advisor(s)
Barry R. Posen.
Alternative Title
Covert action to prevent realignment
Date Issued
2019
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Why do states intervene covertly in some places and not others? This is a pressing question for theorists and policymakers because covert action is widespread, costly, and consequential. I argue that states wield it-whether by supporting political parties, arming dissidents, sponsoring coups, or assassinating leaders-when they fear that a target is at risk of shifting its alignment toward the state that the intervener considers most threatening. Covert action is a rational response to the threat of realignment. Interveners correctly recognize a window of opportunity: Owing to its circumscribed nature, covert action is more likely to be effective before realignment than after. This means that acting sooner is better. I test this argument in case studies of covert action decision-making by the United States in Indonesia, Iraq, and Portugal. I then conduct a test of the theory's power in a medium-N analysis of 97 cases of serious consideration of such action by the United States during the Cold War. Interveners, I suggest, do not employ covert action as a result of bias on the part of intelligence agencies. Nor do they use it to add to their power. Rather, states act covertly when they fear international realignment.
Description
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2019
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-308).
Subjects
Political Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
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MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Persistent DSpace Link
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124273
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