Lewis on iterated knowledge
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11098_2015_Article_568.pdf
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Author(s)
Salow, Bernhard
Salow, Bernhard Joachim
Date Issued
September 2015
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Salow, Bernhard. “Lewis on Iterated Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 6 (September 19, 2015): 1571–1590.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided by Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge” is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in favour of Holliday’s (2015) claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid. However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that counterexamples to the negative iteration principle (¬Kp→K¬Kp) come out as elusive: such counterexamples can occur only in possibilities which the attributors of knowledge are ignoring. This consequence is more defensible than it might look at first sight.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0568-0
