A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind
Name
reconsideringKTE2010_FINALSaxe.pdf
Size
1.51 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
8c76b5518d0089d40cafce259a78eaf5
Author(s)
Phillips, Jonathan
Ong, Desmond C.
Surtees, Andrew D. R.
Frank, Michael C.
Xin, Yijing
Williams, Samantha L.
Saxe, Rebecca R
Date Issued
August 2015
Journal
Psychological Science
Publisher
Sage Publications
Citation
Phillips, Jonathan et al. “A Second Look at Automatic Theory of Mind.” Psychological Science 26, 9 (August 2015): 1353–1367
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
In recent work, Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) argued that human adults automatically represented other agents’ beliefs even when those beliefs were completely irrelevant to the task being performed. In a series of 13 experiments, we replicated these previous findings but demonstrated that the effects found arose from artifacts in the experimental paradigm. In particular, the critical findings demonstrating automatic belief computation were driven by inconsistencies in the timing of an attention check, and thus do not provide evidence for automatic theory of mind in adults. Keywords theory of mind, automaticity, false belief, replication, open data, open materials
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614558717
