The epistemic significance of experience
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11098_2015_537_ReferencePDF.pdf
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532.72 KB
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Checksum (MD5)
818d04cfe87c9d5ab7af345218900ad7
Author(s)
Byrne, Alex
Date Issued
August 2015
Journal
Philosophical Studies
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Byrne, Alex. “The Epistemic Significance of Experience.” Philosophical Studies 173, no. 4 (August 25, 2015): 947–967.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0537-7
