Legal causation*
Name
Legal causation .pdf
Size
1.84 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
bcfaaa34017e3a52716083615ce58807
Author(s)
Byrne, Thomas
Date Issued
October 14, 2022
Journal
Jurisprudence
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Citation
Byrne, T. (2022). Legal causation*. Jurisprudence, 14(1), 55–75.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
I propose a new formalist account of legal (/proximate) causation – one that holds legal causation to be a matter of amoral, descriptive fact. The account starts with a metaphysical relation, akin to but distinct from common-sense causation, and it argues that legal causation aligns exactly with that relation; it is unified and principled.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2022.2119014
