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  4. Software Fault Isolation with Api Integrity and Multi-Principal Modules

Software Fault Isolation with Api Integrity and Multi-Principal Modules

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Author(s)
Mao, Yandong
•
Chen, Haogang
•
Zhou, Dong
•
Wang, Xi
•
Zeldovich, Nickolai
•
Kaashoek, M. Frans
Date Issued
October 2011
Journal
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP '11)
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Citation
Yandong Mao, Haogang Chen, Dong Zhou, Xi Wang, Nickolai Zeldovich, and M. Frans Kaashoek. 2011. Software fault isolation with API integrity and multi-principal modules. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP '11). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 115-128.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
The security of many applications relies on the kernel being secure, but history suggests that kernel vulnerabilities are routinely discovered and exploited. In particular, exploitable vulnerabilities in kernel modules are common. This paper proposes LXFI, a system which isolates kernel modules from the core kernel so that vulnerabilities in kernel modules cannot lead to a privilege escalation attack. To safely give kernel modules access to complex kernel APIs, LXFI introduces the notion of API integrity, which captures the set of contracts assumed by an interface. To partition the privileges within a shared module, LXFI introduces module principals. Programmers specify principals and API integrity rules through capabilities and annotations. Using a compiler plugin, LXFI instruments the generated code to grant, check, and transfer capabilities between modules, according to the programmer's annotations. An evaluation with Linux shows that the annotations required on kernel functions to support a new module are moderate, and that LXFI is able to prevent three known privilege-escalation vulnerabilities. Stress tests of a network driver module also show that isolating this module using LXFI does not hurt TCP throughput but reduces UDP throughput by 35%, and increases CPU utilization by 2.2-3.7x.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72580
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1145/2043556.2043568
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