Resilient  Provision of a Public and/or Private Good,  or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio

Resilient Provision of a Public and/or Private Good, or: Resilient Auctions of One Good in Unlimited Supply

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Author(s)

Chen, Jing

•

Micali, Silvio

Advisor(s)

Silvio Micali

Date Issued

December 2, 2008

Series/Report no.

MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-073

Abstract

We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second for the provision of a private good. Both mechanisms adopt a knowledge-based benchmark.

Subjects

Single-good, unlimited-supply auctions

Resilient mechanism design

Provision of a public good

Knowledge-Based Benchmarks

Persistent DSpace Link

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/43946