Mathematics, time, and confirmation
Name
50103910-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
9.16 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
1ce2dd109d55b36cf6f13b44f1a02f0e
Author(s)
Meyer, Ulrich, 1968-
Advisor(s)
Robert C. Stalnaker.
Date Issued
2001
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This dissertation discusses two issues about abstract objects: their role in scientific theories, and their relation to time. Chapter 1, "Why Apply Mathematics?" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, "Scientific Ontology," is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with natural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, "Prior and the Platonist," demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the "Platonist" thesis that some objects exist "outside" time, and A. N. Prior's proposal for treating tense on the model of modality. Chapter 4, "What has Eternity Ever Done for You?" argues against the widely held view that abstract objects exist eternally ("outside" time), and presents a defense of the rival view that they exist sempiternally (at all times)
Description
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-128).
Subjects
Linguistics and Philosophy.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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