17.884J / 14.296J Collective Choice I, Fall 2005
Name
17-884JFall-2005/OcwWeb/Political-Science/17-884JFall-2005/CourseHome/index.htm
Size
13 KB
Format
HTML
Checksum (MD5)
ed49f259248f5f603cd7627b5474aba1
Author(s)
Snyder, James M.
Alternative Title
Collective Choice I
Date Issued
December 2005
Abstract
Examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective. Graduate students are expected to pursue the subject in greater depth through reading and individual research. Advanced undergrads may take subject with faculty approval. From the course home page: Course Description This is an applied theory course covering topics in the political economy of democratic countries. This course examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus will be placed on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective.
Subjects
Political science
economics
political economy
democratic
countries
collective
choice
electoral competiton
public goods
size
government
taxation
income redistribution
macroeconomic policy
voting models
equilibrium models
information
learning
agency models
political parties
vote-buying
vote-trading
resource allocation
Colonel Blotto
interest groups
lobbying
legislatures
bargaining
coalitions
government
stability
informational
distributive
theories
executive
relations
representative democracy
Terms of Use
Persistent DSpace Link
