Multipollutant markets
Name
2001-008.pdf
Size
249.06 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
74918c2f087a63359bfb5997d4d90f32
Author(s)
Montero, Juan-Pablo
Date Issued
2001
Publisher
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Series/Report no.
MIT-CEEPR (Series) ; 01-008WP.
Abstract
I study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g. air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should have pollution markets integrated through optimal exchange rates when the marginal abatement cost curves in the different markets are steeper than the marginal benefit curves; otherwise he should keep markets separated. I also find that incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration.
Persistent DSpace Link
