Information Percolation With Equilibrium Search Dynamics
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Manso_Information Percolation.PDF
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335.7 KB
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Author(s)
Duffie, Darrell
Malamud, Semyon
Manso, Gustavo
Date Issued
October 2009
Journal
Econometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society
Publisher
Econometric Society
Citation
Duffie, Darrell, Semyon Malamud, and Gustavo Manso. “Information Percolation With Equilibrium Search Dynamics.” Econometrica 77.5 (2009): 1513-1574.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information. When two agents meet, they share their information. The information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings, and so on. Equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally. A tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can, in some cases, increase welfare. On the other hand, endowing agents with public signals reduces information sharing and can, in some cases, decrease welfare.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta8160
