Bayesian Proportional Resource Allocation Games
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Tsitsiklis_Bayesian proportional.pdf
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342.43 KB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Tsitsiklis, John N.
Xu, Yunjian
Date Issued
February 2011
Journal
Proceedings of the 48th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2010
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
Tsitsiklis, John N. and Yunjian Nu. "Bayesian Proportional Resource Allocation Games." Proceedings of the IEEE 2010 Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing: 1556-1561. © 2010 IEEE.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We consider a proportional allocation mechanism that gives to each user an amount of a resource proportional to the user's bid. We study a corresponding Bayesian game in which each user has incomplete information on the state or type of the other users. We prove the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, under some mild assumptions, we establish asymptotic efficiency: we show that the per user social welfare achieved at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium is asymptotically equal to the maximum possible.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2010.5707098
