Possibilistic Beliefs and Higher-Level Rationality
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MIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-013.pdf
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Author(s)
Chen, Jing
Micali, Silvio
Pass, Rafael
Advisor(s)
Silvio Micali
Date Issued
June 9, 2014
Series/Report no.
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2014-013
Abstract
We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible with the players being level-k rational coincide with the strategies surviving a natural k-step iterated elimination procedure. We view the latter strategies as the (level-k) rationalizable ones in our possibilistic setting.
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