From philosophical traditions to scientific developments: reconsidering the response to Brouwer’s intuitionism
Name
11229_2022_Article_3908.pdf
Size
1.02 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
8d15be6919bc7401d7510b8dbff7fe52
Author(s)
Kish Bar-On, Kati
Date Issued
December 14, 2022
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Synthese. 2022 Dec 14;200(6):521
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Abstract
Brouwer’s intuitionistic program was an intriguing attempt to reform the foundations of mathematics that eventually did not prevail. The current paper offers a new perspective on the scientific community’s lack of reception to Brouwer’s intuitionism by considering it in light of Michael Friedman’s model of parallel transitions in philosophy and science, specifically focusing on Friedman’s story of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Such a juxtaposition raises onto the surface the differences between Brouwer’s and Einstein’s stories and suggests that contrary to Einstein’s story, the philosophical roots of Brouwer’s intuitionism cannot be traced to any previously established philosophical traditions. The paper concludes by showing how the intuitionistic inclinations of Hermann Weyl and Abraham Fraenkel serve as telling cases of how individuals are involved in setting in motion, adopting, and resisting framework transitions during periods of disagreement within a discipline.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Program in Science, Technology and Society
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03908-3
