Moderation of an Ideological Party
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Author(s)
Yildiz, Muhamet
Pokladnikova, Vlasta
Date Issued
March 2008
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Pokladnikov, Vlasta, and Muhamet Yildiz. “Moderation of an ideological party.” Games and Economic Behavior 65.2 (2009): 516-537.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but
will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results
when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties
within the democratic system is more effective.We show that, as the probability of state’s intervention in the
next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme policy in equilibrium. This hurts
the median voter. Our main result shows that from the median voter’s perspective, the optimal intervention
scheme can be implemented by committing not to intervene and adjusting election times appropriately. That
is, elections are a better incentive mechanism than the threat of a coup.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.010
