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Optimal Dynamic Capital Budgeting

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sword-2021-04-09T17:25:41.original.xml (130 B)
Original SWORD entry document
Author(s)
Malenko, Andrey
Date Issued
2019
Journal
Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
© The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited. I study optimal design of a dynamic capital allocation process in an organization in which the division manager with empire-building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects, and headquarters can audit projects at a cost. Under certain conditions, a budgeting mechanism with threshold separation of financing is optimal. Headquarters: (1) allocate a spending account to the manager and replenish it over time; (2) set a threshold, such that projects below it are financed from the account, while projects above are financed fully by headquarters upon an audit. Further analysis studies when co-financing of projects is optimal and how the size of the account depends on past performance of projects.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Persistent DSpace Link
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135109
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDY043
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