There Is No Free House: Ethnic Patronage in a Kenyan Slum
Name
app.20160484.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
979.27 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
aff8c27c041a93a2978e389d27e642da
Author(s)
Marx, Benjamin
Stoker, Thomas M
Suri, Tavneet
Date Issued
2019
Journal
AEJ: Applied Economics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Version
Final published version
Abstract
© 2019 American Economic Association. Using unique data from one of Africa's largest informal settlements, the Kibera slum in Nairobi, we provide evidence of ethnic patronage in the determination of rental prices and investments. Slum residents pay higher rents and live in lower quality housing (measured via satellite pictures) when the landlord and the locality chief belong to the same ethnicity. Conversely, rental prices are lower, and investments higher when residents and chiefs are co-ethnics. Our identification relies on the exogenous appointment of chiefs and is supported by several tests, including a regression discontinuity design.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/APP.20160484
