Profit loss in Cournot oligopolies
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Tsitsiklis_EMB July 2016 Profit loss.pdf
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Author(s)
Tsitsiklis, John N
Xu, Yunjian
Date Issued
May 2013
Journal
Operations Research Letters
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Tsitsiklis, John N. and Xu, Yunjian. “Profit Loss in Cournot Oligopolies.” Operations Research Letters 41, 4 (July 2013): 415–420 © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We compare the aggregate profit achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, which would be obtained if the suppliers were to collude. We establish a lower bound on the profit of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter that captures qualitative properties of the inverse demand function and the number of suppliers (or the maximum of the suppliers’ market shares). The lower bounds are tight when the inverse demand function is affine.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2013.04.012
