All-pay auctions as models for military annexation
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12076_2022_306_ReferencePDF.pdf
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948.95 KB
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Author(s)
Kang, Benjamin
Unwin, James
Date Issued
May 13, 2022
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Citation
Kang, Benjamin and Unwin, James. 2022. "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation."
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Abstract
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8
