Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India
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Banerjee_Marry for what.pdf
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Author(s)
Banerjee, Abhijit
Duflo, Esther
Ghatak, Maitreesh
Lafortune, Jeanne
Date Issued
May 2013
Journal
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune. “Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (May 2013): 33-72.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one's own group or for "marrying up." We then estimate actual preferences for caste and other attributes using a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements and find only a strong preference for in-caste marriage. This translates, in equilibrium, in caste doing little to alter the matching patterns on non-caste attributes.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.33
