Bidding to drive: Car license auction policy in Shanghai and its public acceptance
Name
Bidding to Drive.pdf
Description
Bidding to Drive: Car License Auction Policy in Shanghai and Its Public Acceptance
Size
1.54 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
e1a7604ce0a8bfbbb40d76f7530bbd02
Author(s)
Chen, Xiaojie
Zhao, Jinhua
Date Issued
February 2013
Journal
Transport Policy
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Chen, Xiaojie and Zhao, Jinhua. “Bidding to Drive: Car License Auction Policy in Shanghai and Its Public Acceptance.” Transport Policy 27 (May 2013): 39–52. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Increased automobile ownership and use in China over the last two decades has increased energy consumption, worsened air pollution, and exacerbated congestion. However, the countrywide growth in car ownership conceals great variation among cities. For example, Shanghai and Beijing each had about 2 million motor vehicles in 2004, but by 2010, Beijing had 4.8 million motor vehicles whereas Shanghai had only 3.1 million. Among the factors contributing to this divergence is Shanghai’s vehicle control policy, which uses monthly license auctions to limit the number of new cars. The policy appears to be effective: in addition to dampening growth in car ownership, it generates annual revenues up to 5 billion CNY (800 million USD). But, despite these apparent successes, the degree to which the public accepts this policy is unknown.
This study surveys 524 employees at nine Shanghai companies to investigate the policy acceptance of Shanghai’s license auction by the working population, and the factors that contribute to that acceptance: Perceived policy effectiveness, affordability, equity concerns, and implementation. Respondents perceive the policy to be effective, but are moderately negative towards the policy nonetheless. However, they expect that others accept the policy more than they do. Respondents also hold consistently negative perceptions about the affordability of the license, the effects on equity, and the implementation process. Revenue usage is not seen as transparent, which is exacerbated by a perception that government vehicles enjoy advantages in obtaining a license, issues with the bidding process and technology, and difficulties in obtaining information about the auction policy. Nevertheless, respondents believe that license auctions and congestion charges are more effective and acceptable than parking charges and fuel taxes. To improve public acceptability of the policy, we make five recommendations: Transparency in revenue usage; transparency in government vehicle licensing and use, categorizing licenses by vehicle type, implementation and technology improvements to increase bidding convenience, and policies that restrict vehicle usage in congested locations.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2012.11.016
