Wartime Commercial Policy and Trade between Enemies
Name
isec_a_00412.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
208.03 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
8455fb21d93d5ce8f734b434d2ae5ee6
Author(s)
Grinberg, Mariya
Date Issued
July 19, 2021
Journal
International Security
Publisher
MIT Press
Citation
Mariya Grinberg; Wartime Commercial Policy and Trade between Enemies. International Security 2021; 46 (1): 9–52.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Why do states trade with their enemies during war? States make deliberate choices when setting their wartime commercial policies, and tailoring policies to match the type of war the states are expecting to fight. Specifically, states seek to balance two goals–maximizing revenue from continued trade during the war and minimizing the ability of the opponent to benefit militarily from trade. As a result, states trade with the enemy in (1) products that their opponents take a long time to convert into military capability, and (2) products that are essential to the domestic economy. Furthermore, states revise their wartime commercial policies based on how well they are doing on the battlefield. An analysis of British wartime commercial policy in World War I finds that a product's conversion time into military capabilities determines if and when that product will be prohibited from trade during the war. Alternatively, domestic political pressures play only a marginal role in wartime commercial policy decisions.
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00412
