Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
Name
1604.00693.pdf
Description
Accepted version
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755.79 KB
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Author(s)
Awad, Edmond
Caminada, Martin WA
Pigozzi, Gabriella
Podlaszewski, Mikołaj
Rahwan, Iyad
Date Issued
2017
Journal
Journal of Logic and Computation
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a
defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to
evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the
problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of
arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the
outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social
optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have
their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current
paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation
operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under
different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental
trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand,
and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further
investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation
theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation
operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the
nature of agents' preferences.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Media Laboratory
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1093/LOGCOM/EXX017
