Competence versus Priorities: Negative Electoral Responses to Education Quality in Brazil
Name
715064.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
616.81 KB
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Unknown
Checksum (MD5)
9e4c09784aa0cc7377d500502f2d9aa3
Author(s)
Boas, Taylor C
Hidalgo, Fernando Daniel
Toral, Guillermo
Date Issued
2021
Journal
The Journal of Politics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Competence versus Priorities: Negative Electoral Responses to Education Quality in Brazil
Taylor C. Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Guillermo Toral
The Journal of Politics 2021 83:4, 1417-1431
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Do voters reward politicians for the quality of public services? We address this question by studying voters’ responses to signals of municipal school quality in Brazil, a setting particularly favorable to electoral accountability. Findings from a regression discontinuity design and a field experiment are strikingly consistent. Contrary to expectations, signals of school quality decrease electoral support for the local incumbent. However, we find the expected effect among citizens for whom school quality should be most salient—parents with children in municipal schools. Using an online survey experiment, we argue that voters who do not value education interpret school quality as an indicator of municipal policy priorities and perceive trade-offs with other services. Voters may hold politicians accountable not only for their competence but also for their representation of potentially conflicting interests—a fact that complicates the simple logic behind many accountability interventions.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/715064
