STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY
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Schmalensee_Standard-Setting.PDF
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270.86 KB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Schmalensee, Richard
Date Issued
August 2009
Journal
Journal of Industrial Economics
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing
Citation
Schmalensee, Richard. "STANDARD-SETTING, INNOVATION SPECIALISTS AND COMPETITION POLICY." The Journal of Industrial Economics 57.3 (2009): 526-552.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSO's). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSO's should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00388.x
