Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources
Name
PhysRevA.94.032315.pdf
Size
394.95 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
e919ced9811500952348afc3be6f176e
Author(s)
Lim, Charles Ci Wen
Xu, Feihu
Siopsis, George
Chitambar, Eric
Evans, Philip G.
Qi, Bing
Date Issued
September 2016
Journal
Physical Review A
Publisher
American Physical Society
Citation
Lim, Charles Ci Wen et al. “Loss-Tolerant Quantum Secure Positioning with Weak Laser Sources.” Physical Review A 94.3 (2016): n. pag. © 2016 American Physical Society
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. Recently, it has been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication (LOCC) adversaries. Here, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser sources and linear optics. In this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.94.032315
