Rousseau's Freedom as Recognition
Name
European J of Philosophy - 2025 - Perilla - Rousseau s Freedom as Recognition.pdf
Size
1.51 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
54720ddce237d30b99866f08595b1308
Author(s)
Perilla, Julian
Date Issued
June 19, 2025
Journal
European Journal of Philosophy
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
Perilla, J. (2025). Rousseau's Freedom as Recognition. European Journal of Philosophy, e13088.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
To yearn for freedom is to want to be seen by others as someone. Rousseau, I believe, held such a conception of freedom, alongside his intricate theory of human passions. This essay examines how freedom relates to such passions, and in particular, to the Rousseauian notion of amour-propre. Importantly, the aim here is both interpretive and positive. The essay seeks to locate Rousseau within the old republican tradition in a manner that parts ways with most contemporary readings of Rousseau. But, in doing so, it argues that republican freedom essentially involves a particular status and the recognition of such status by others. On this Rousseauian view, one is free to the extent that others see one as a limit to their arbitrary interference and as entitled to interfere with them non-arbitrarily. Finally, republican freedom, so understood, is shown to be essential to meeting the demands of healthy amour-propre, thereby bringing Rousseau's political and psychological theories closer together.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13088
