Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players

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Chen, Hassidim, Micali (2010) Resilient and Virtually Perfect Revenue from Perfectly Informed Players.pdf

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Author(s)
Chen, Jing
•
Hassidim, Avinatan
•
Micali, Silvio
Date Issued
January 13, 2010
Publisher
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Citation
Chen, J., Hassidim, A., & Micali, S. (2010). Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players (ECIR Working Paper 2010-1). MIT Political Science Department.
Version
Author's final manuscript.
Series/Report no.
ECIR Working Paper No. 2010-1
Abstract
We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • Works for any number of players n > 1.
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