14.126 Game Theory, Spring 2010
Name
14-126-spring-2010/contents/index.htm
Size
34.46 KB
Format
HTML
Checksum (MD5)
cae825d8cbfe2fe7fa31946b093c7f5f
Author(s)
Manea, Mihai
Yildiz, Muhamet
Alternative Title
Game Theory
Date Issued
June 2010
Abstract
This course is a rigorous investigation of the evolutionary and epistemic foundations of solution concepts, such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium. It covers classical topics, such as repeated games, bargaining, and supermodular games as well as new topics such as global games, heterogeneous priors, psychological games, and games without expected utility maximization. Applications are provided when available.
Subjects
extensive-form games
Nash equilibria
evolutionary equilibria
bargaining with incomplete information
rationalizability
non-cooperative games
110401
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Persistent DSpace Link
