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Security-proof framework for two-way Gaussian quantum-key-distribution protocols

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Author(s)
Zhang, Zheshen
•
Lütkenhaus, Norbert
•
Shapiro, Jeffrey H.
•
Zhuang, Quntao
Date Issued
September 2018
Journal
Physical Review A
Publisher
American Physical Society
Citation
Zhuang, Quntao et al. "Security-proof framework for two-way Gaussian quantum-key-distribution protocols." Physical Review A 98, 3 (September 2018): 032332 © 2018 American Physical Society
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Two-way Gaussian protocols have the potential to increase quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols' secret-key rates by orders of magnitudes [Phys. Rev. A 94, 012322 (2016)2469-992610.1103/PhysRevA.94.012322]. Security proofs for two-way protocols, however, are underdeveloped at present. In this paper, we establish a security proof framework for the general coherent attack on two-way Gaussian protocols in the asymptotic regime. We first prove that coherent-attack security can be reduced to collective-attack security for all two-way QKD protocols. Next, we identify two different constraints that each provide intrusion parameters which bound an eavesdropper's coherent-attack information gain for any two-way Gaussian QKD protocol. Finally, we apply our results to two such protocols.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Physics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118873
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.98.032332
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