Unobserved-Offers Bargaining
Name
wolitzky-2022-unobserved-offers-bargaining.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
833.14 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
91ad37bec9640f64399db7e11b65d0f9
Author(s)
Wolitzky, Alexander
Date Issued
January 2023
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Wolitzky, Alexander. 2023. "Unobserved-Offers Bargaining." American Economic Review 113 (1): 136–73.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
I study ultimatum bargaining with imperfectly observed offers. Imperfectly observed offers must be rejected with positive probability, even when the players’ preferences are common knowledge. Noisier observations imply a greater risk of rejection. In repeated ultimatum bargaining, the responding party can obtain a positive payoff if his signal of the opponent’s offer is also observed by the opponent herself, but not if his signal is private. In alternating-offers bargaining, a player is better off when her own offers are observed more precisely and her opponent’s offers are observed less precisely. Possible applications include international relations, regulation, principal-agency, and product quality provision. (JEL C73, C78, D82)
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
10.1257/aer.20211524
