Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World
Name
Acemoglu_EMB UNTIL Oct 2018 Asymmetric.pdf
Size
943.88 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
788733a63dc6d2da8a54c49af5b407d0
Author(s)
Robinson, James A.
Verdier, Thierry
Acemoglu, K. Daron
Date Issued
October 2017
Journal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Thierry Verdier. “Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World.” Journal of Political Economy 125, no. 5 (October 2017): 1245–1305.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countries. Some countries become technology leaders and opt for a type of “cutthroat” capitalism with greater inequality and innovations, while others free ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more “cuddly” form of capitalism with greater social insurance for entrepreneurs.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/693038
