Political Economy in a Changing World
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682679.pdf
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Author(s)
Egorov, Georgy
Sonin, Konstantin
Acemoglu, K. Daron
Date Issued
September 2015
Journal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. “Political Economy in a Changing World.” Journal of Political Economy 123, no. 5 (October 2015): 1038–1086. © 2015 The University of Chicago
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/682679
