Quantum Private Queries: Security Analysis
Name
Giovannetti-2010-Quantum Private Quer.pdf
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293.16 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
4a92f61f0e9dc85722c8cc4be1e8bd28
Author(s)
Giovannetti, Vittorio
Lloyd, Seth
Maccone, Lorenzo
Date Issued
July 2010
Journal
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
Giovannetti, Vittorio, Seth Lloyd, and Lorenzo Maccone. “Quantum Private Queries: Security Analysis.” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 56.7 (2010): 3465-3477. Web. 3 Feb. 2012. © 2010 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Version
Final published version
Abstract
A security analysis of the recently introduced Quantum Private Query (QPQ) protocol is presented. The latter is a cheat sensitive quantum protocol to perform a private search on a classical database. It allows a user to retrieve an item from the database without revealing which item was retrieved, and at the same time it ensures data privacy of the database (the information that the user retrieves in a query is bounded). The security analysis is based on information-disturbance tradeoffs which show that whenever the provider tries to obtain information on the query, the query (encoded into a quantum system) is disturbed so that the person querying the database can detect the privacy violation. The security bounds are derived under the assumption that a unique answer corresponds to each query. To remove this assumption, some simple variants of the protocol are illustrated, and it is conjectured that analogous security bounds apply to them.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1109/tit.2010.2048446
