Framing effects in the prisoner’s dilemma but not in the dictator game
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Author(s) • •
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Rand, David Gertler
Walkowitz, Gari
Date Issued
December 2019
Journal
Journal of the Economic Science Association
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Citation
Goerg, Sebastian J. et al. "Framing effects in the prisoner’s dilemma but not in the dictator game." Journal of the Economic Science Association 6, 1 (December 2019): 1–12 © 2019 Economic Science Association
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We systematically investigate prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games with valence framing. We find that give versus take frames influence subjects’ behavior and beliefs in the prisoner’s dilemma games but not in the dictator games. We conclude that valence framing has a stronger impact on behavior in strategic interactions, i.e., in the prisoner’s dilemma game, than in allocation tasks without strategic interaction, i.e., in the dictator game.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-019-00081-1