Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
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Angeletos-2013-Selection-free predi.pdf
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Author(s) •
Angeletos, George-Marios
Pavan, Alessandro
Date Issued
October 2013
Journal
Theoretical Economics
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Citation
“Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria.” Theoretical Economics 8, no. 3 (2013): 883-938.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper, we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that cannot be delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is conducted within a flexible family of games of regime change, which have been used to model, inter alia, speculative currency attacks, debt crises, and political change. The endogeneity of information originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure of iterated elimination of nonequilibrium strategies is used to deliver probabilistic predictions that an outside observer—an econometrician—can form under arbitrary equilibrium selections. The sharpness of these predictions improves as the noise gets smaller, but disappears in the complete-information version of the model.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/te1156