Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms
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pandp.20181079.pdf
Description
Published version
Size
485.27 KB
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Checksum (MD5)
39f327aad09bdad118f70a3311e352f2
Author(s)
Agarwal, Nikhil
Ashlagi, Itai
Somaini, Paulo
Waldinger, Daniel
Date Issued
May 2018
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Agarwal, Nikhil, Ashlagi, Itai, Somaini, Paulo and Waldinger, Daniel. 2018. "Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoretical results to show that the welfare effects of a mechanism depend on the interaction between dynamic incentives and heterogeneity in preferences. We show evidence suggesting that patient decisions on the deceased donor kidney wait list respond to dynamic incentives. Therefore, an empirical approach to dynamic mechanism design is an essential complement to mechanism design theory in dynamic environments.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1257/PANDP.20181079
