Selection on moral hazard in health insurance
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Author(s) • • • •
Einav, Liran
Finkelstein, Amy
Ryan, Stephen
Schrimpf, Paul
Cullen, Mark R.
Date Issued
February 2013
Journal
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
Einav, Liran et al. "Selection on moral hazard in health insurance." American Economic Review, 103(1): 178-219.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We use employee-level panel data from a single rm to explore the possibility that
individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral
( moral hazard ) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label selection on moral
hazard. Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of
heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implica-
tions. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection
on moral hazard could lead to over-estimates of the spending reduction associated with
introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
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DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.178
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.178