Kernel Extension DSLs Should Be Verifier-Safe!
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3748355.3748368.pdf
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495.08 KB
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Author(s)
Solleza, Franco
Adam, Justus
Crotty, Andrew
Narayan, Akshay
Schwarzkopf, Malte
Tatbul, Nesime
Date Issued
September 8, 2025
Publisher
ACM|3rd Workshop on eBPF and Kernel Extensions
Citation
Franco Solleza, Justus Adam, Akshay Narayan, Malte Schwarzkopf, Andrew Crotty, and Nesime Tatbul. 2025. Kernel Extension DSLs Should Be Verifier-Safe! In Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on eBPF and Kernel Extensions (eBPF '25). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 55–62.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
eBPF allows developers to write safe operating system extensions, but writing these extensions remains challenging because it requires detailed knowledge of both the extension's domain and eBPF's programming interface. Most importantly, the extension must pass the eBPF verifier.
This paper argues that DSLs for extensions should guarantee verifier-safety: valid DSL programs should result in eBPF code that always passes the verifier. This avoids complex debugging and the need for extension developers to be eBPF experts. We show that three existing DSLs for different domains are compatible with verifier-safety. Beyond verifier-safety, practical extension DSLs must also achieve good performance. Inspired by database query optimization, we sketch an approach to creating DSL-specific optimizers capable of maintaining verifier-safety. A preliminary evaluation shows that optimizing verifier-safe extension performance is feasible.
Description
eBPF ’25, September 8–11, 2025, Coimbra, Portugal
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1145/3748355.3748368
