Institutional Investor Attention and Firm Disclosure
Name
SSRN-id3066136.pdf
Description
Submitted version
Size
710.19 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
c7d340b318c443434f404179942c67b4
Author(s)
Abramova, Inna
Core, John E.
Sutherland II, Andrew Victor
Date Issued
January 2020
Journal
The Accounting Review
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Citation
Abramova, Inna et al. “Institutional Investor Attention and Firm Disclosure.” The Accounting Review, 95, 6 (January 2020): 1-21 © 2020 The Author(s)
Version
Original manuscript
Abstract
We study how short-term changes in institutional owner attention affect managers’ disclosure choices. Holding institutional ownership constant and controlling for industry-quarter effects, we find that managers respond to attention by increasing the number of forecasts and 8-K filings. Rather than alter the decision of whether to forecast or to provide more informative disclosures, attention causes minor disclosure adjustments. This variation in disclosure is primarily driven by passive investors. Although attention explains significant variation in the quantity of disclosure, we find little change in abnormal volume and volatility, the bid-ask spread, or depth. Overall, our evidence suggests that management responds to temporary institutional investor attention by making disclosures that have little effect on information quality or liquidity.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2018-0494
