Information flow control for secure web sites
Name
320087093-MIT.pdf
Description
Full printable version
Size
14.23 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
bb2a9658210cc375a72ba67f972e5d78
Author(s)
Krohn, Maxwell N. (Maxwell Norman)
Advisor(s)
Frans Kaashoek, Robert Morris and Eddie Kohler.
Date Issued
2008
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Sometimes Web sites fail in the worst ways. They can reveal private data that can never be retracted [60, 72, 78, 79]. Or they can succumb to vandalism, and subsequently show corrupt data to users [27]. Blame can fall on the off-the-shelf software that runs the site (e.g., the operating system, the application libraries, the Web server, etc.), but more frequently (as in the above references), the custom application code is the guilty party. Unfortunately, the custom code behind many Web sites is difficult to secure and audit, due to large and rapidly-changing trusted computing bases (TCBs). A promising approach to reducing TCBs for Web sites is decentralized information flow control (DIFC) [21, 69, 113]. DIFC allows the split of a Web application into two types of components: those inside the TCB (trusted), and those without (untrusted). The untrusted components are large, change frequently, and do most of the computation. Even if buggy, they cannot move data contrary to security policy. Trusted components are much smaller, and configure the Web site's security policies. They need only change when the policy changes, and not when new features are introduced. Bugs in the trusted code can lead to compromise, but the trusted code is smaller and therefore easier to audit. The drawback of DIFC, up to now, is that the approach requires a major shift in how programmers develop applications and thus remains inaccessible to programmers using today's proven programming abstractions. This thesis proposes a new DIFC system, Flume, that brings DIFC controls to the operating systems and programming languages in wide use today. Its key contributions are: (1) a simplified DIFC model with provable security guarantees; (2) a new primitive called endpoints that bridges the gap between the Flume DIFC model and standard operating systems interfaces; (3) an implementation at user-level on Linux; and (4) success in securing a popular preexisting Web application (MoinMoin Wiki).
Description
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-125).
Subjects
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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