Real Effects of PCAOB International Inspections
Name
SSRN-id2667969.pdf
Description
Accepted version
Size
1.48 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
3257fa92ee2b7f8e56c0a9ba5510cca4
Author(s)
Shroff, Nemit
Date Issued
2019
Journal
The Accounting Review
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
© 2019 American Accounting Association. All rights reserved. This paper examines the effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on companies' financing and investing decisions. Difference-in-differences regression estimates suggest that companies respond to their auditor receiving a "deficiency-free" inspection report by issuing additional external capital amounting to 1.4 percent of assets and increasing investment by 0.5 percent of assets. These effects are larger for (1) financially constrained companies and (2) companies located in countries where there is no regulator or the regulator does not conduct inspections. Further, the effect on financing decisions is stronger in countries with (1) low corruption, (2) strong rule of law, and (3) high regulatory quality. Descriptive evidence suggests that inspections increase the use of financial covenants in debt contracts, which is likely one of the mechanisms through which inspections generate real effects. This paper documents the value of PCAOB inspections in mitigating financing frictions for non-U.S. companies.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.2308/ACCR-52635
